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Abstract Understanding what determines Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows
remains a primary concern of economists and policy makers; yet the uncertainty sur-
rounding FDI theories and empirical approaches has created ambiguity regarding
the determinants of FDI. This paper applies Extreme Bounds Analysis to identify
the robust determinants of FDI using panel data covering 168 countries from 1970
to 2006. We consider 58 potential economic, geographic and political determinants
and find that almost one-third are robust, including: openness, education, government
spending, corporate tax rate, infrastructure, experience of conflict, democratic gover-
nance, natural resources, geographic location, number of borders, coastal location and
language.
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1 Introduction
Understanding what determines Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) remains a primary
concern of economists and policy makers. However, the main determinants of FDI
are still poorly understood because of the uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding both
theories and empirical approaches to FDI. Given the sheer amount of possible deter-
minants that theory and intuition suggest, it is not possible to nest all of them in
a grand specification in a general-to-specific approach; thus, it is difficult to know
which regressors are truly significant and which ones appear to be so as a result of
omitted variable bias. “Extreme Bounds Analysis” (EBA), first developed by Leamer
(1983, 1985) and Leamer and Leonard (1983), provides robustness and sensitivity
tests of explanatory variables in regressions, in order to determine which regressors
are robust and which are fragile. Widely applied in cross-country growth regressions,
the procedure has not as yet found widespread application in the analysis of the deter-
minants of FDI: As far as we are aware, only Chakrabarti (2001), Moosa and Cardak
(2006) and Moosa (2009) have used EBA to identify the robust determinants of FDI.
This paper undertakes an exhaustive search for robust determinants of FDI by
applying EBA, as developed by Sala-i-Martin (1997). We advance the literature on
the determinants of FDI in several ways. First, we use a larger sample and a more
comprehensive set of variables than in previous work on FDI. We include all possible
determinants of FDI suggested by previous studies, which we group into two cate-
gories: “economic” and “geopolitical” country characteristics. In addition, the paper
examines the role of geographical and institutional variables that have not been ade-
quately explored in the current literature using the EBA method. Second, we use a
panel data set, while previous applications of EBA (the three studies mentioned above)
are only applied in a cross-section context; ours is the first study to apply EBA with a
panel data set to the determinants of FDI. Third, this panel data set is one of the most
extensive used in FDI analysis. We show that almost one-third of the previously sug-
gested FDI determinants are robust. The next section outlines the EBA methodology
and discusses the data and variables to be used in each EBA application. The results
are discussed in Sect. 3, while Sect. 4 concludes the paper.
2 Estimation methodology
2.1 The EBA approach
Following standard practice in conducting EBA, we estimate Eq. (1). For each country
i, and each specific regression jk (where j ∈ [1, M], k ∈ [1, K ] as specified below),
we have:
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(
FDI
Y
)
i t
=∝i j +β jkXi t + γ jk Iki t + δ jkZkj i t + εi j t (1)
where
(
FDI
Y
)
i
is FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP into country i. The explana-
tory variables on the right-hand side are divided in three groups: The first is n
standard (‘core’) explanatory variables that are included in every single regres-
sion (in addition to a constant) denoted Xi t = (X1i t X2i t · · · Xnit ), where,
β jk = (β1k β2k · · · βnk )′. Following Levine and Renelt (1992), we use a set
of exactly three core variables, Xi t , that are always kept in the equation. The second
is Iki t , which is the kth variable of interest whose robustness we are testing and is a
single variable selected from the set of variables Zi t , where the latter is a Kx1 vec-
tor containing all of the possible determinants of FDI that are not included in Xi t .
Following Leamer (1983), we consider all of the remaining variables in Zi t (one at a
time and each in turn) as Iki t . Zi t is identified from a wide range of past studies as
including potentially important candidate determinants (beyond Xi t ) that need to be
controlled for in FDI regressions. The third is Zkj i t , which is a 3x1 vector of exactly
three additional control variables chosen from the pool of possible (non-core) explana-
tory variables, Zi t , that do not include Iki t . For each k, all the possible combinations
of the remaining K − 1 variables in the predetermined pool of variables Zi t is con-
sidered; there are M
[
= (K−1)!
(K−1−3)!×3!
]
such combinations. Further, j = 1, 2, . . ., M ,
where j denotes the j th estimated combination of the variables: the j th model. The
robustness of each variable of interest, Iki t , is tested while controlling for Xi t and all
the possible combinations Zkj i t . Exactly three variables are included in Z
k
j i t , partly to
follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) original methodology and also to avoid the perception
of data mining or selective reporting of results.1 There are M possible combinations
for each of the k = 1, 2, . . ., K variables of interest, giving a total of M × K possible
regressions. Finally, εi t is an error term. The aim is to investigate the effects on the sta-
tistical significance of γ jk , the coefficient on the kth variable of interest, when varying
the combinations of three variables included inZkj i t . The ( j = 1, 2, . . . , M) estimated
coefficients for each Iki t
(
γˆ jk
)
and Xi t
(
βˆ jk
)
are recorded. The standard deviation of
these M coefficient estimates is calculated for each Iki t and is denoted as σˆk .
Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) version of EBA, which we follow here, is based on the frac-
tion of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γˆ jk that lies to the right of zero.2
If this fraction is sufficiently large (small) for a positive (negative) relationship, Iki t is
1 We apply EBA with an intercept, the variable of interest, Iki t , the same three core variables in all
regressions, Xi t , and allowing the Zkj i t variables to come in combinations of exactly three, giving seven
explanatory variables plus an intercept in all estimated models. This follows almost all of the growth
literature where at least seven explanatory variables are included in reported models. Fixing the number of
regressors that appear in each regression has a direct effect on the size of the estimated coefficients (see
Leon-Gonzalez and Montolio 2004) and it limits the number of the models that are explored.
2 In early versions of the test, Leamer (1983, 1985) and Leamer and Leonard (1983), a coefficient is robust
if its Extreme Bounds (EB) are of the same sign. The EB are defined as: LowerEB ≡ γˆmink − 2σˆk and
UpperEB ≡ γˆmaxk + 2σˆk , where γˆmaxk and γˆmink are the highest and lowest values of γˆ jk , respectively. In
our case, unsurprisingly, no variables showed up as robust according to this very restrictive criterion.
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regarded as robust: specifically, if more than 90% (less than 10%) of theCDF for γˆ jk is
above zero, Iki t is robust. We apply two variants of Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) EBA, being
the normal and non-normal CDF methods. Sala-i-Martin’s method involves the calcu-
lationof aCDF for eachvariable of interest, Iki t , using the ( j = 1, 2, . . . , M) estimated
coefficients, γˆ jk , and estimated coefficient variances, σˆ
2
jk . Using these values themean
of γˆ jk is constructed as the average of each of the M γˆ jk , thus, γ¯k = ∑Mj=1 1M γˆ jk .3
Similarly, the average of the coefficient variances are σ¯2k =
∑M
j=1 1M σˆ
2
jk .
4 Assuming
the γ jk have a standard normal distribution across the M models, the CDF is eval-
uated at zero as 
(
0|γ¯k, σ¯2k
)
, where  denotes the cumulative density based on the
standard normal distribution. Finally, the CDF(0) statistics indicates the larger of the
areas under the density function either side of zero [hence 0.5 ≤ CDF(0) ≤ 1], that
is:
CDF(0) =  (0|γ¯k, σ¯2k) if  (0|γ¯k, σ¯2k) ≥ 0.5
CDF(0) = 1 −  (0|γ¯k, σ¯2k) if  (0|γ¯k, σ¯2k) < 0.5 (2)
According to Sala-i-Martin (1997), if the γ jk are not normally distributed across
the M models for any particular k, CDF(0) can be calculated using the individual
CDFs for each of the M regressions. The CDF for the j th regression is denoted as:
Fj
(
0| γˆ jk, σˆ 2jk
)
where:
Fj
(
0| γˆ jk, σˆ2jk
)
=  j
(
0| γˆ jk, σˆ2jk
)
if  j
(
0| γˆ jk, σˆ2jk
)
≥ 0.5
Fj
(
0| γˆ jk, σˆ2jk
)
= 1 −  j
(
0| γˆ jk, σˆ2jk
)
if  j
(
0| γˆ jk, σˆ2jk
)
< 0.5
(3)
The aggregate “non-normal” CDF, denoted CDF(0)∗, is calculated as the average of
the ( j = 1, 2, . . . , M) individual CDFs (3), thus:
CDF(0)∗ = 1
M
M∑
j=1
Fj
(
0| γˆ jk, σˆ2jk
)
(4)
Variables are regarded as robust when both CDFs are at least 0.90. The degree of
robustness is assigned as follows: robust at the 1% level when CDF(0) ≥ 0.99 or
CDF(0)∗ ≥ 0.99 (which is denoted with ***), robust at the 5% level when either
3 We are careful to exclude regressions where the regressions do not estimate.
4 Note that because of a missing data problem, we do not attach different weights to different models’
parameters. Furthermore, the integrated likelihood (which has been suggested as a weight) may not be a
good indicator of the probability that a model is the true model (see Sala-i-Martin 1997). For these reasons,
we are unable to use the extension of this approach called Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates
(BACE), introduced by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). We have also not followed Granger and Uhlig’s (1990)
criterion whereby regressions are included if their R2 is higher than a threshold, or otherwise discarded; the
dual reason is the arbitrariness of the threshold and the ‘knife-edge’ nature of the criterion (e.g., a regression
would fully count if its R2 = 0.6—say—but be completely discarded if R2 = 0.59).
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CDF ≥ 0.95 (**), robust at the 10% level when both CDF ≥ 0.90 (*).5 A variable is
regarded as a “fragile” determinant of FDI otherwise.6
We carry out two applications of the EBA procedure: firstly using only economic
variables (results reported in Sect. 3.1) and then augmenting the dataset with the inclu-
sion of political and geographic variables (Sect. 3.2). In the first of these applications,
we test all possible variables considered in both Xi t and Zi t for robustness. In all
applications, we report the results based on Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) method assuming
both normal and non-normal CDFs (cf. 2 and 4 respectively).
2.2 Data
We consider 58 potential economic, political and geographical explanatory factors.7
The definitions of the variables used are given in Table 1. Data were constructed from a
number of sources, includingWorldDevelopment Indicators 2006 (World Bank 2006).
The political and institutional variables are obtained from the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG), and we construct the geographical dummy variables. Our sample
is an unbalanced annual panel dataset for 168 economies over the period 1970–2006.
2.3 Estimation issues
Our first application of EBA that considers only economic determinants employ the
fixed-effects estimator in all regressions; this is so as it is more likely to ensure con-
sistent estimates than the random-effects estimator.8 However, the random-effects
estimator is employed in our second EBA application that incorporates economic,
geographical and political variables because some of these variables are perfectly
collinear with the (cross-sectional) fixed-effects.
A potential problem for our estimates is endogeneity, which causes OLS estimators
to be biased and inconsistent. We identify three potential determinants as being the
most likely to be endogenously determined with FDI as the current account balance
(% of GDP-CAB), GDP growth (GDPG) and per-capita GDP (GDPP).9 We therefore
treat CAB, GDPG and GDPP as potentially endogenous in our EBA applications
because the costs of incorrectly treating exogenous variables as endogenous are much
lower than incorrectly assuming endogenous variables are exogenous. This means that
these three variables are excluded from Xi t and Zi t in all EBA applications and are
5 We take 0.90 as the posterior probability threshold following Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Fernandez et al.
(2001).
6 Exactly the same procedure is applied to (and statistics reported for) the coefficient estimates βˆ jk in our
first EBA application.
7 See Chakrabarti (2001, Table 1) and ODI (1997) for detailed discussions of empirical findings on the
determinants of FDI. Table 1 in his paper indicates how ambiguous the evidence is.
8 Application of the Hausman test and F test in initial modelling suggested the use of the fixed-effects
estimator.
9 To confirm endogeneity we applied the Wu–Hausman test based upon a fixed-effects estimated example
regression. The results, available upon request, suggest failure of weak exogeneity for these variables.
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only considered as Iki t variables. Hence, the only inference that could be affected by
endogeneity bias is when these covariates are considered as the variable of interest.
3 Results
This section presents the empirical results of our two EBA applications. In Sect. 3.1,
we discuss the results of the EBA applied only to economic variables; in Sect. 3.2, we
discuss the EBA application involving economic, political and geographical variables.
3.1 EBA using only economic variables
The 30 potential economic determinants of FDI that we consider in our first EBA
application are listed in the left-hand side ofTable 1. The following three core variables,
Xi t , that are always kept in the equation are: openness (denoted OPEN), inflation
(INFL), and tax on trade (TTRADE). These core variables are chosen because they
have been shown to be robustly linked to FDI in previous empirical work (as well as
in our initial experiments), and we do not expect them to be endogenous. All of the
remaining 27 economic determinants are considered as the variable of interest, Iki t ;
however, only 24 of these are included in Zkj i t because we are seeking to minimise the
impact of any endogeneity bias that the current account balance (CAB), GDP growth
(GDPG) and per-capita GDP (GDPP) variables may cause.10
Tables 2, 3, 4, 5 summarise the results of our first EBA application. The first column
reports the variable of interest under consideration. For each Iki t variable four sets of
EBA statistics are reported: one set for the Iki t variable (reported in Table 5) and one
set for each of the 3 core variables: OPEN (Table 2), INFL (Table 3) and TTRADE
(Table 4).11 Some models cannot be estimated due to insufficient observations, and
this causes some variation in the number of regressions run for the different Iki t .
The column headed “AVG coeft” gives the variable’s coefficient averaged over the
number of regressions used in the EBAapplication. Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) non-normal
CDF [denoted CDF(0)∗] and normal CDF [CDF(0)] statistics are also reported in the
tables. Bold emphasis indicates that a variable is robust based upon Sala-i-Martin’s
criteria. For a variable to be robust, it must have a CDF of at least 0.90 according to
both normal and non-normal criteria (the normal and non-normal CDF broadly yield
the same inference); otherwise, the variable is said to be fragile.
Table 2 indicates that the core variable, Trade openness index (OPEN), is robust
in 26 out of 27 sets of EBA results (the exception is when TIMEB is the variable
of interest). This result is consistent with many previous studies that found openness
towards trade to be a significant determinant of FDI (e.g. Chakrabarti 2001; Moosa
10 In our first EBA application, the variables in Zi t have pairwise correlation coefficients that are (in all
cases) below 0.5 in magnitude. This should limit the problem of multicollinearity which can adversely
affect conclusions regarding robustness.
11 InTables 2, 3, 4, each core variable is tested for robustnesswith the test results specified in a disaggregated
form for each of the non-core variables. In contrast, Table 5 assesses the robustness of the non-core variables
of interest, Iki t .
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Table 2 First EBA application
with only economic
variables—results for Open
The first column (headed “Iki t ”)
reports the variable of interest
used in the EBA application and
the results relate to the core
variable OPEN. “AVG coeft”
represents each Iki t variable’s
coefficient averaged over the
number regressions used in the
EBA application.
Sala-i-Martin’s (1997)
non-normal CDF is denoted
“CDF(0)∗ and the normal CDF
is “CDF(0)”. Bold emphasis
indicates that a variable is robust
(otherwise it is fragile) based
upon Sala-i-Martin’s criteria.
*** denotes robustness at the
0.99 level, ** at the 0.95 level
and * at the 0.90 level
Iki t AVG coeft. CDF(0)
∗ CDF(0)
GDPP 0.059*** 0.986 0.999
GDPG 0.053*** 0.983 0.997
CAB 0.063*** 0.990 0.992
CGD 0.914*** 0.994 1.000
FDIO 0.056*** 0.993 0.998
GCF 0.057*** 0.990 0.999
GFE 0.059*** 0.992 1.000
GS 0.063*** 0.992 0.999
HMTAXCOR 0.108*** 0.984 0.998
INTERNET 0.073*** 0.994 1.000
INTRESPRD 0.064*** 0.991 0.999
LIQUID 0.031** 0.906 0.951
LIR 0.062*** 0.993 0.999
NRESERVE 0.053** 0.929 0.972
POPTL 0.069*** 0.985 0.998
RAIL 0.072*** 0.981 0.996
RATIOP 0.069*** 0.982 0.997
RATIOS 0.068*** 0.980 0.995
RATIOT 0.057*** 0.987 0.999
REX 0.155*** 0.952 1.000
RIR 0.062*** 0.992 0.999
ROADS 0.044** 0.951 0.980
TAXPROFR 0.061*** 0.991 0.999
TEL 0.057*** 0.958 1.000
TIMEB 0.020 0.672 0.607
UNEM 0.091*** 0.999 1.000
WGETOGDL 0.061*** 0.988 0.999
and Cardak 2006). In all 27 cases, OPEN has an average coefficient sign (“AVG coeft”)
that is positive which is consistent with theoretical expectations. From Table 3, the
INFL core variable is robust in only one (RATIOT) of the 27 EBA sets and is a fragile
determinant for the remaining 26 Iki t . The TTRADE core variable is robust in only one
(CGD) of the 27 EBA sets and is a fragile determinant otherwise, see Table 4. This is
considered as strong evidence against TTRADE and INFL being robust determinants
of FDI.
From Table 5 we see that eight non-core variables are unambiguously robust deter-
minants of FDI because both of their CDFs exceed 0.90. These are current account
balance (CAB), GDP growth rate (GDPG), GDP per capita (GDPP), highest mar-
ginal corporate tax rate (HMTAXCOR), outgoing FDI (FDIO), tertiary and secondary
school enrolment (RATIOT and RATIOS, resp.) and Government final expenditure
(GFE). The negative and robust coefficient of HMTAXCOR suggests that high corpo-
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Table 3 First EBA application
with only economic
variables—results for Infl
The first column (headed “Iki t ”)
reports the variable of interest
used in the EBA application and
the results relate to the core
variable INFL. All other labels
are defined as in Table 2. Bold
emphasis indicates that a
variable is robust (otherwise it is
fragile) based upon
Sala-i-Martin’s criteria. ***
denotes robustness at the 0.99
level, ** at the 0.95 level and *
at the 0.90 level
Ikit AVG coeft. CDF(0)∗ CDF(0)
GDPP −0.003 0.806 0.623
GDPG −0.001 0.764 0.524
CAB −0.003 0.813 0.605
CGD −0.011 0.631 0.705
FDIO −0.003 0.813 0.574
GCF −0.002 0.797 0.571
GFE −0.003 0.766 0.608
GS −0.002 0.789 0.568
HMTAXCOR −0.013 0.699 0.579
INTERNET −0.001 0.837 0.827
INTRESPRD −0.005 0.770 0.624
LIQUID −0.007 0.832 0.827
LIR −0.003 0.768 0.606
NRESERVE −0.015 0.793 0.665
POPTL −0.004 0.793 0.570
RAIL −0.002 0.749 0.526
RATIOP 0.001 0.770 0.524
RATIOS −0.005 0.748 0.775
RATIOT −0.020** 0.909 0.962
REX −0.013 0.766 0.779
RIR −0.004 0.598 0.656
ROADS −0.004 0.812 0.570
TAXPROFR −0.002 0.784 0.586
TEL −0.004 0.805 0.583
TIMEB 0.141 0.808 0.807
UNEM −0.010 0.814 0.684
WGETOGDL −0.005 0.611 0.682
rate taxes in the host country will have a robust negative effect on FDI, in line with the
finding of Becker and Fuest (2012). Government expenditure as a proportion of GDP
(GFE) is also robust and has, on average, a negative sign, validating the critics of gov-
ernment (see e.g. Mitchell 2005; Sinn 1995). The tertiary enrolment ratio (RATIOT)
and secondary enrolment ratio (RATIOS) are both found to be robust determinants of
FDI with generally positive coefficients, which are consistent with previous literature
and implies that education attracts FDI.12 FDI outflows (FDIO) is another robust deter-
minant of FDI inflows. This could be because the multinational corporations (MNCs)
of developing countries may be both the recipients of incoming FDI and originators
of outgoing FDI; thus, FDI and FDIO may be positively correlated. Both GDPG and
12 See for instance the theoretical analysis of Lucas (1993) and the empirical findings of Zhang and
Markusen (1999), Dunning (1988) and Noorbakhsh and Paloni (2001).
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Table 4 First EBA application
with only economic
variables—results for Ttrade
The first column (headed “Iki t ”)
reports the variable of interest
used in the EBA application and
the results relate to the core
variable TTRADE. All other
labels are defined as in Table 2.
Bold emphasis indicates that a
variable is robust (otherwise it is
fragile) based upon
Sala-i-Martin’s criteria. ***
denotes robustness at the 0.99
level, ** at the 0.95 level and *
at the 0.90 level
Iki t AVG coeft. CDF(0)
∗ CDF(0)
GDPP −0.002 0.736 0.712
GDPG −0.001 0.754 0.503
CAB −0.008 0.747 0.754
CGD 0.696*** 0.956 1.000
FDIO 0.002 0.756 0.616
GCF 0.003 0.764 0.718
GFE 0.009 0.758 0.560
GS 0.002 0.750 0.510
HMTAXCOR 0.034 0.665 0.636
INTERNET 0.046 0.764 0.739
INTRESPRD 0.014 0.770 0.581
LIQUID −0.010 0.775 0.563
LIR 0.013 0.750 0.577
NRESERVE −0.006 0.744 0.522
POPTL 0.040 0.670 0.694
RAIL 0.005 0.759 0.520
RATIOP 0.034 0.715 0.659
RATIOS 0.047 0.723 0.668
RATIOT 0.007 0.752 0.744
REX 0.155 0.824 0.894
RIR 0.013 0.753 0.579
ROADS 0.058 0.766 0.779
TAXPROFR −0.007 0.757 0.544
TEL 0.063 0.845 0.854
TIMEB −0.088 0.675 0.598
UNEM 0.078 0.807 0.812
WGETOGDL 0.028 0.740 0.653
GDPP robustly and positively affect FDI. As these are measures of future prospects
and market size and demand, this finding is consistent with theoretical expectations;
however, we cannot rule out bi-directional causality. Additionally, we find that the cur-
rent account balance (CAB) affects FDI, the negative sign is consistent with theory;
however, bi-directional or even reverse causality cannot be ruled out. In sum, all of the
nine robust variables (OPEN, GFE, FDIO, RATIOS, RATIOT, CAB, GDPG, GDPP,
HMTAXCOR) have theoretically plausible (average) coefficient signs. However, we
treat the finding of robustness for the three potentially endogenous variables CAB,
GDPG and GDPP with caution and hesitate to conclude that our results offer strong
support for it.
Apart from these nine variables, all of the other variables in our first EBA appli-
cation are fragile. Comparing our findings with previous applications of EBA to FDI
provides interesting insights. Moosa and Cardak (2006) found telephone mainlines
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Table 5 First EBA application
with only economic
variables—results for Ikit
The first column (headed “Iki t ”)
reports the variable of interest
used in the EBA application and
the results relate to Iki t . All
other labels are defined as in
Table 2. Bold emphasis indicates
that a variable is robust
(otherwise it is fragile) based
upon Sala-i-Martin’s criteria.
*** denotes robustness at the
0.99 level, ** at the 0.95 level
and * at the 0.90 level
Iki t AVG coeft. CDF(0)
∗ CDF(0)
GDPP 0.004** 0.939 0.981
GDPG 0.078* 0.917 0.931
CAB −0.123*** 0.995 0.999
HMTAXCOR −0.157** 0.940 0.981
FDIO 0.055* 0.905 0.922
GCF 0.057 0.835 0.817
GFE −0.174*** 1.000 0.940
RATIOT 0.018** 0.987 0.950
RATIOS 0.355*** 0.995 1.000
INTERNET −0.001 0.764 0.636
INTRESPRD 0.019 0.753 0.679
LIQUID 0.010 0.680 0.648
LIR −0.004 0.751 0.579
NRESERVE 1.8 × 10−12 0.682 0.544
POPTL 0.008 0.749 0.558
RAIL 0.001 0.679 0.600
RATIOP −0.019 0.742 0.660
CGD −0.005 0.700 0.585
GS 4.03 × 10−12 0.733 0.718
REX −0.015 0.720 0.715
RIR −0.007 0.713 0.596
ROADS 3.46 × 10−7 0.645 0.563
TAXPROFR −0.041 0.840 0.842
TEL 0.004 0.805 0.835
TIMEB −0.025 0.760 0.741
UNEM −0.104 0.744 0.771
WGETOGDL 0.180 0.841 0.818
to be robust, whereas we find it to be fragile in this application; however, we do find
it to be a robust determinant in the next application when we consider both geopo-
litical and economic variables. Further, Moosa and Cardak found GDP growth and
tertiary education enrolments to be fragile, while we find these variables to be robust.
Chakrabarti (2001) found openness to be robust as we do, though not GDP growth.
3.2 EBA using economic, geographical and political variables
In our second EBA application, we include OPEN, GFE and RATIOS as our core
variables following the results of our first EBA. OPEN is chosen because it is the only
core variable from our first EBA application that is robust. Since the other two core
variables (INFL and TTRADE) are not robust in our first EBA application, we seek
123
Identifying the robust economic, geographical and political… 771
two different core variables; those should, firstly, be robust with an average coefficient
sign that is consistent with theoretical expectations in the first EBA application and
that have the highest value for CDF(0)∗; secondly, they must not be amongst the
3 potentially endogenous variables. The three variables with the highest values for
CDF(0)∗ are GFE (CDF(0)∗ = 1.00), RATIOS (0.95) and CAB (0.95). Since we
regard CAB as potentially endogenous, we select the other 2 as core variables, along
with OPEN, to be employed in our second EBA application.
We add 28 geographical and political variables (described on the right-hand side
of Table 1) to the economic variables to be considered in the second EBA application,
allowing us to test the robustness of an extended set of variables. The geopolitical
variables are not included in the core set of variables, Xi t , or the set of three Zkj i t
variables (to help avoid multicollinearity); however, they are all considered (in turn)
as the variable of interest, Iki t . All of the economic variables (except the three core
variables) are considered (in turn) as Iki t and inZkj i t (except for the potentially endoge-
nous variables, CAB, GDPG and GDPP, and the three core variables).13 The focus
in this second application is to determine whether country specific institutions (such
as democracy, rule of law, corruption, bureaucracy, ethnic and international conflict
and type of political regime),14 cultural factors (languages) or geographical locations
(number of boundaries, coastal location, abundance of natural resources, proximity to
particular regions) can influence FDI. Many geographical and political/institutional
factors have been conclusively linked to economic growth (e.g., Durlauf et al. 2005)
and remain active areas of research. The results of our second EBA application are
reported in Table 6.
Ten of the 28 geopolitical variables are considered as robust determinants of FDI as
both of their CDFs are at least 0.90. These include the dummies for: countries in the
South Asia region (SA), countries in the East Asia and Pacific region (EAP), countries
withmore than 3 boundaries (GTBUN), countries that are not land-locked (LANDUN-
LOCKED), Spanish (SPN)- and Arabic (ARB)-speaking countries as well as nations
with greater democratic accountability (DEMO). These seven determinants are all
generally positively correlated with FDI inflows. The other three robust geopolitical
variables are dummies for countries experiencing low international and internal con-
flict (CONFLICTINT) and economies with an abundance of the natural resources: oil
(OILDUMMY) and gas (GASDUMMY).15 These three determinants are all generally
negatively correlated with FDI inflows.
DEMO is a robust determinant with a generally positive coefficient sign, which
is expected as democracy increases transparency and reduces arbitrariness and red
13 The maximum number of regressions estimated in the first and second EBA applications are 48,576
and 98,164, respectively. However we only obtain results from 15,148 and 85,369 regressions, respectively.
Thus, in the two EBA applications, we estimated 146,740 models and obtain results from 100,517.
14 Political and other institutions are a vibrant area of research in growth theory and empirics (see e.g.
Easterly and Levine 2003; Glaeser et al. 2004; and Durlauf et al. 2005).
15 Our results also show that the SSA (Sub-Saharan African region) and MENA (Middle East and North
Africa) dummies are fragile determinants of FDI. One plausible explanation is the weak institutions in these
regions.
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Table 6 Second EBA application with economic and geopolitical variables—Ikit results
Iki t AVG coeft. CDF(0)
∗ CDF(0) Iki t AVG coeft. CDF(0)∗ CDF(0)
ARB 16.223*** 0.97 1.00 FDIO 0.733*** 0.985 1.000
SA 19.505*** 0.98 1.00 CGD 0.696*** 0.983 1.000
LANDUNLOCKED 0.696*** 0.95 1.000 CAB −0.123*** 0.995 0.999
SPN 0.953** 0.965 0.961 INTERNET 0.010** 0.984 0.988
GTBUN 1.162** 0.98 0.950 GDPP 0.004** 0.939 0.981
EAP 4.371* 0.90 0.92 RATIOT −5.718** 0.907 0.950
DEMO 0.340* 0.90 0.91 TEL 0.010* 0.919 0.944
CONFLICTINT −0.216** 0.95 0.90 GDPG 0.078* 0.917 0.931
OILDUMMY −3.332* 0.94 0.90 LIQUID 0.011 0.841 0.892
GASDUMMY −3.213* 0.93 0.90 GCF 0.161 0.870 0.869
PARL −1.240 0.83 0.85 TAXPROFR −0.041 0.840 0.842
LAW −1.189 0.88 0.85 POPTL 0.196 0.814 0.800
ECA 2.494 0.81 0.80 HMTAXCOR −0.202 0.744 0.771
ENG −2.039 0.81 0.78 RIR 0.017 0.583 0.716
SBUN 1.944 0.74 0.77 REX −0.020 0.722 0.715
SSA −2.040 0.77 0.76 UNEM 0.069 0.753 0.691
REPB 0.127 0.77 0.72 TTRADE −0.021 0.753 0.684
MENA −1.747 0.70 0.67 INTRESPRD 0.019 0.753 0.679
ETHNIC −0.093 0.77 0.66 ROADS 8.509 × 10−7 0.647 0.649
NOBUND −1.269 0.70 0.64 NRESERVE 5.989 × 10−11 0.708 0.626
SURFACE 1.8 × 10−7 0.63 0.62 WGETOGDL −8.698 0.726 0.591
LAC 0.847 0.75 0.61 LIR 0.004 0.696 0.579
RTEAD 0.007 0.675 0.598 RAIL 7.076 × 10−6 0.655 0.574
BUREAU 0.187 0.60 0.58 GS −4.309 × 10−13 0.670 0.568
FRC 0.563 0.72 0.56 TIMEB −0.002 0.787 0.562
WTO −0.898 0.74 0.56 INFL −0.005 0.668 0.560
CORR 0.030 0.70 0.54 RATIOP 3.939 × 10−5 0.610 0.504
COMMU 0.166 0.64 0.52
The column headed “Iki t ” reports the variable of interest used in the EBA application and the results relate
to Iki t . All other labels are defined as in Table 2. Bold emphasis indicates that a variable is robust (otherwise
it is fragile) based upon Sala-i-Martin’s criteria. *** denotes robustness at the 0.99 level, ** at the 0.95
level and * at the 0.90 level
tape (Jensen 2008 and Li 2009).16 The internal and external conflict variable (CON-
FLICTINT) is robust with a generally negative coefficient sign. This is consistent with
a priori expectations as less conflict reduces incertitude amongst potential investors,
16 However, Asiedu and Lien (2011) find that democracy attracts FDI in countries where the share of
natural resources in total exports is low, but has a negative effect on FDI in countries where exports are
dominated by natural resources. This statement may to some extent explain why we did not find the SSA
andMENA regions as robust determinants of FDI (the countries in these regions have weak democracy and
their exports are dominated by natural resources—see the previous Footnote).
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which raises FDI. Hence, our results support the notion that an increase in institu-
tional quality (as indicated by greater democracy and lower conflict) would strengthen
incoming FDI; these results are consistent with previous analyses (e.g. Globerman and
Shapiro 2002; Sachs 2003). It is noteworthy that various other variables whose rele-
vance has been highlighted in the theory of growth, such as rule of law, corruption,
bureaucracy, ethnic conflict or type of political regime, are fragile determinants of FDI.
Our results also suggest that language is an important factor in attracting FDI. We
found that countries where Arabic and Spanish are the main language have higher
incoming FDI ceteris paribus. This result may be driven by the higher incoming FDI
into countries such as the Middle East and Latin America, as opposed to others in
Africa and elsewhere in which English or French are the official languages; dummies
representing countries where English and French are themain language are found to be
fragile. International languages such as English and to some extent French may play a
role in attracting FDI, but they are often spoken bymuch of the population in countries
where they are not the main language and this may help explain why countries where
English and French are the main languages do not receive any significant increases
in incoming FDI. We also find that coastal countries tend to attract more FDI: the
dummy“LANDUNLOCKED”, indicating countries that are not landlocked, is a robust
determinant with a generally positive sign. This is consistent with findings in growth
empirics (Easterly and Levine 2003). Furthermore, countries with more than three
boundaries attract more FDI than those with fewer boundaries given the robust and
generally positive coefficient. This is also in the spirit of the previous finding (the
“landunlocked” feature): a country with more neighbours has more freedom to trade
and, hence, better prospects for incoming FDI. While “landlockedness” has been
emphasised in the past as a factor affecting growth and FDI, the finding that the
numbers of borders affects FDI is, we believe, novel.
Natural resource abundance in the form of oil and gas (OILDUMMY and GAS-
DUMMY, respectively) are both found to be robust determinants of FDIwith generally
negative coefficient signs. This is a kind of “Dutch disease”, akin to that highlighted by
Sachs and Warner (1995) in relation to growth; see also Tietenberg and Lewis (2006).
This reasoning will of course not apply to specifically resource-seeking firms, which
would naturally be attracted by resource abundance; this would explain the inflows of
FDI into the Arab Gulf and African countries. All other geopolitical variables exert
only a fragile influence on FDI.
FromTable 6we see that eight non-core economic variables are robust determinants
of FDI:CAB,GDPG,GDPP,CGD,FDIO, INTERNET,RATIOTandTEL.These find-
ings for economic variables are similar to those inTable 5 in that FDIO,RATIOT,CAB,
GDPG and GDPP are found to be robust in both of our EBA applications—broadly
confirming the robustness of these results. For economic variables, the average coef-
ficient signs are the same in Tables 6 and 5 except for RATIOT which has a generally
negative coefficient sign in Table 6; this change in coefficient sign between the two
EBA applications may be due to RATIOS being a core variable in the second appli-
cation and not the first. Table 6 suggests three additional robust economic variables,
which are central government debt (CGD), internet use (INTERNET) and telephone
mainline use (TEL). CGD appears as robust with a generally negative coefficient: this
is expected, as debt may have a number of adverse consequences, such as inducing
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higher interest rates and raising default risk. The latter two capture communication
facilities. As expected an increase in internet and telephone use increases FDI inflows,
as indicated by the generally positive coefficient signs for these variables. All of the
other economic variables in our second EBA application are fragile.
4 Conclusion
We investigate the determinants of incoming Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) using
ExtremeBoundsAnalysis (EBA) to address the issue ofmodel uncertainty.We employ
an unbalanced panel dataset covering 168 countries over the period 1970 to 2006. We
consider 58 economic, geographical and political variables that have been previously
proposed as determinants of FDI. As far as we are aware, this is the largest set of
variables and the largest coverage of data in any analysis of the determinants of FDI.
Our EBA application to FDI further extends previous work in its use of a large panel
dataset instead of just cross-sectional data which previous EBA analyses employ and
by the inclusion of political and geographical factors as well as economic variables.
In these respects we believe our work significantly extends the existing literature that
seeks to understand the determinants of FDI. We use Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) EBA
approach to carry out two analyses: one with only economic variables using the fixed-
effects estimator, and one that includes all our variables (economic, political and
geographic) employing random-effects to avoid collinearity.
In our first EBA application that only considers economic determinants, we find
that the following six variables (excluding the three potentially endogenous covari-
ates) have a robust relationship (with average coefficient signs that are consistent with
theoretical expectations) according to both of Sala-i-Martin’s Cumulative Distribu-
tion Function (CDF) criteria: Trade openness index, outgoing FDI, Government final
expenditure (% of GDP), highest marginal corporate tax rate, tertiary and secondary
school enrolment. However, the three variables current account balance, GDP growth
rate and GDP per capita are robust if potentially subject to problems of endogeneity.
Based upon this, we use Trade openness, Government final expenditure and the sec-
ondary school enrolment variables as the core variables in our second EBA application
that considers both economic and geopolitical determinants of FDI.
According to both of Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) CDF criteria, our second EBA appli-
cation reveals that 18 of the 55 (non-core) variables are robust determinants of FDI.
There are ten robust geopolitical determinants that suggest the following relations
with inward FDI. Countries located in South Asia, East Asia and the pacific region,
that have more than 3 boundaries, that are not land-locked, that are Spanish or Arabic
speaking, that have greater democratic accountability and that experience less conflict
attract more FDI. Natural resource abundance (in terms of oil and gas) has a negative
impact on FDI. Additionally, excluding the three potentially endogenous variables,
there are four robust (non-core) economic determinants of inward FDI in the second
application whose average coefficient signs are consistent with theoretical expecta-
tions; these are Central Government debt, outgoing FDI, number of Internet users,
and number of Telephone lines. Tertiary school enrolment is robust; however, it has
an unexpected average coefficient sign. Together with the three core variables, these
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are our final list of robust determinants: The above ten geopolitical determinants, five
economic determinants, plus the three core variables that are considered robust on the
basis of the first application. All other variables are deemed fragile. These results are
generally consistent with previous analyses and prior arguments.
Our study has important implications for policies aimed at promoting FDI and,
therefore, economic development. Openness suggests the need for governments to
maintain economies open to international trade, fostering competition and innovation.
Education at secondary and tertiary levels suggests the need for human capital to
be promoted and skills and labour productivity more broadly to be developed. Gov-
ernment expenditures generally crowd out resources from the private sector; hence,
government spending is robust and negatively related to incoming FDI.17 At the same
time, the need to maintain orderly public finances is highlighted by the presence of
government debt, which is robustly negative; this is so as higher debt implies, ceteris
paribus, higher future taxes. The role of this variable has not been highlighted in pre-
vious literature, although it plays a prominent role in public discourse. Internet usage
and number of telephone lines are variables that signify both a developed internal
market and a developed infrastructure. The role of government policy in maintaining
the former was highlighted above; at the same time, government, in association with
the private sector, also has a critical role to play in enhancing the latter. Furthermore,
business taxation is important in maintaining a thriving business environment and here
is another important role for government policy. Our results suggest that economic
institutions and their quality matter in attracting FDI: democratic governance, avoid-
ance of conflict as well as openness promote profitability, investment and incoming
FDI. More broadly, institutional quality and quality of governance matters, as has
been repeatedly affirmed in the context of growth analyses. Thus, we find a role for
government policies with relevance at different horizons, from the short term (govern-
ment spending, taxation) to the medium term (education, infrastructure) to the long
term (taxation again, orderly public finances, institutional quality). In all, incoming
FDI is considered as a key part of the process of development; our study identifies
its key determinants and highlights several which leave a critical role to be played by
government policy for their promotion.
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